



TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2026)0367

UN Climate Change Conference 2026 in Antalya, Türkiye (COP31)

European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2026 on the 2026 UN Climate Change Conference in Antalya, Türkiye (COP31) (2026/2666(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,
- having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),
- having regard to the 30th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP30), the 20th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP20), the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA7), and the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at COP26 on 13 November 2021,
- having regard to the agreement made at COP27 to create a specific fund for loss and damage, the establishment of a transitional committee on the operationalisation of the new funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage at COP28, and the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage,
- having regard to the agreement made at COP29 on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) and the objective to triple financing for developing countries to USD 300 billion annually by 2035 and secure efforts from all actors to work together to scale up financing for developing countries, from public and private sources, to USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035, and to the outcomes of COP30 further clarifying its implementation framework, including on access, transparency and accountability, and including a call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 within the NCQG,
- having regard to the Global Framework on Chemicals – For a Planet Free of Harm from Chemicals and Waste, adopted under the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in September 2023¹,

¹ UN Environment Programme, ‘Text of the Global Framework on Chemicals’, <https://www.chemicalsframework.org/page/text-global-framework-chemicals>.

- having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2025 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2025 in Belém, Brazil (COP30)²,
- having regard to the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, adopted at COP29,
- having regard to the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels held from 24 to 29 April 2026 in Santa Marta, Colombia,
- having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
- having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report of 28 October 2025 on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement,
- having regard to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report of 23 March 2026 on the state of the global climate in 2025,
- having regard to the Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S) and the WMO joint report entitled ‘European State of the Climate 2025’,
- having regard to the UNEP report of 4 November 2025 entitled ‘Emissions Gap Report 2025: Off target’,
- having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2026 on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2026 High-Level Political Forum³,
- having regard to the EU legislation enacting policies across various sectors to meet the EU’s targets of reducing net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and to meet the binding EU climate neutrality target by 2050 (‘Fit for 55’ package),
- having regard to the recently amended EU Climate Law⁴, introducing a binding EU-wide 2040 climate target of a 90 % net reduction in GHG emissions compared to 1990 levels, together with the associated flexibilities and review mechanisms,
- having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030⁵, as well as the European Environment Agency report of 10 December 2025 entitled ‘Monitoring report on progress towards the 8th EAP objectives 2025’ (EEA report 09/2025) and the 8th EAP mid-term review by the Commission,
- having regard to the European Environment Agency report of 29 September 2025 entitled ‘Europe’s environment 2025’,

² OJ C, C/2026/2101, 29.4.2026, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2101/oj>.

³ Text adopted, P10_TA(2026)0250.

⁴ Regulation (EU) 2026/667 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2026 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 as regards the setting of a Union intermediate climate target for 2040 (OJ L, 2026/667, 18.3.2026, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/667/oj>).

⁵ OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/591/oj>.

- having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency⁶,
- having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),
- having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, agreed at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP15) and to the 16th UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP16),
- having regard to the Agreement under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement),
- having regard to Decision 16/22 adopted at the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
- having regard to Resolution 8.039 of the International Union for Conservation of Nature of 10 October 2025 entitled ‘Mobilising the role of wild animals in ecosystems as a climate solution’,
- having regard to the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on the impacts of global warming of 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels, its special report on climate change and land, its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate and its sixth assessment report (AR6),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2024 entitled ‘Securing our future – Europe’s 2040 climate target and path to climate neutrality by 2050 building a sustainable, just and prosperous society’ (COM(2024)0063),
- having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Managing climate risks – protecting people and prosperity’ (COM(2024)0091),
- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 June 2023 entitled ‘A new outlook on the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence’ (JOIN(2023)0019), and to the joint staff working document of 18 February 2025 entitled ‘Progress Report on the implementation of the Joint Communication – ‘A New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus’’ (SWD(2025)0049),
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and

⁶ OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.

amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942⁷,

- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869⁸,
- having regard to Directive (EU) 2025/2360 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 November 2025 on soil monitoring and resilience (Soil Monitoring Law)⁹,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 establishing a Union certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products¹⁰,
- having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 41/21 of 12 July 2019 entitled ‘Human rights and climate change’,
- having regard to the Just Transition Declaration adopted on 4 November 2021 at COP26,
- having regard to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 23 July 2025 entitled ‘obligations of states in respect of climate change’,
- having regard to the UN General Assembly Resolution 80/263 of 20 May 2026 endorsing the advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 on the obligations of states in relation to climate change,
- having regard to the UN Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention),
- having regard to the European Environment Agency report of 11 March 2024 entitled ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’,
- having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 and 16 October 2026 [...],
- having regard to the Council conclusions of 12 October 2026 in view of the 31st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP31) in Antalya, Türkiye,
- having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the 2026 UN Climate Change Conference in Antalya, Türkiye (COP31) (O-000036/2026 – B10-0018/2026 and O-000037/2026 – B10-0019/2026),
- having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety,

A. whereas Parliament has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has

⁷ OJ L, 2024/1787, 15.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1787/oj>.

⁸ OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj>.

⁹ OJ L, 2025/2360, 26.11.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2025/2360/oj>.

¹⁰ OJ L, 2024/3012, 6.12.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3012/oj>.

committed to take urgent action to contain this threat;

- B. whereas the Paris Agreement, signed and ratified by all EU Member States, entered into force on 4 November 2016;
- C. whereas access to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is a universal human right;
- D. whereas Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that environmental protection must be guaranteed in EU law; whereas Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that a high level of protection shall be established for the Union policy on the environment;
- E. whereas according to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2025¹¹, full implementation of the unconditional NDCs made under the Paris Agreement for 2030 would set the world on course to limit the global temperature rise to 2,5 °C this century, and fully implementing conditional NDCs would lower this temperature rise to 2,3 °C;
- F. whereas the 2025 NDC synthesis report¹² states that the global GHG emission level in 2030 is projected to fall 6 % below the 2019 level; whereas the IPCC concludes that in scenarios limiting warming to 1,5 °C, GHG emissions need to be at least 43 % below the 2019 level by 2030;
- G. whereas EU legislation establishes a reduction target of at least 55 % for net GHG emissions by 2030, and a 90 % reduction target by 2040, compared to 1990 levels and together with the associated flexibilities;
- H. whereas the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) recommends the urgent and full phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies in the EU, in line with current commitments; whereas the eighth environmental action programme (EAP) requires the establishment of a deadline for ending such subsidies to this effect;
- I. whereas according to the C3S and WMO joint report, 2025 was the third-warmest year on record, with global temperature estimated as being 1,4 °C above pre-industrial levels, and global average atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ and CH₄ continued to increase in 2025¹³; whereas according to the findings of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, the last 11 years have been the hottest years ever recorded, with 2023 to 2025 being the hottest three years ever recorded and global temperatures averaging more than 1,5 °C above pre-industrial levels for the first time over a three-year period¹⁴;
- J. whereas the COP31 Presidency has proposed several 2035 targets for the conference's action agenda, including an electrification target to raise the share of final energy demand met by electricity to 35 %, halving growth in global waste, increasing the global circular material use rate to at least 15 %, and a resilient cities target of reducing

¹¹ UNEP report, 4 November 2025, '[Emissions Gap Report 2025: Off Target](#)'.

¹² UNFCCC Secretariat, 28 October 2025, synthesis report, 'Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement'.

¹³ C3S-WMO, 2026, European State of the Climate Report 2025.

¹⁴ The European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, 2026, <https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-2025-was-third-hottest-year-record>.

energy consumption intensity in the building sector by at least 25 %;

- K. whereas the EU co-launched the Global Methane Pledge at COP26, with a view to reducing methane emissions by 30 % by 2030, relative to 2020 levels; whereas the UN Secretary-General has launched a global call to action calling for decisive action to be taken across the three largest methane-emitting sectors, namely fossil fuels, agriculture and waste¹⁵;
- L. whereas according to UNFCCC, food loss and waste accounts for 8 to 10 % of annual global greenhouse gas emissions¹⁶;
- M. whereas the conservation, protection, restoration and sustainable management of nature and ecosystems, such as forests, wetlands and peatlands, constitute cost-effective and nature-based solutions that are key to achieving the temperature and adaptation goals of the Paris Agreement;
- N. whereas the 2020 workshop on biodiversity and climate change, co-sponsored by the IPCC and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, highlighted that reintroducing key species can be beneficial for both biodiversity and climate mitigation and adaptation; whereas scientific evidence shows that wild animals sustain key ecosystem functions that deliver nature-based solutions for climate change mitigation and ecosystem resilience, including contributions to forest generation, soil fertility, nutrient cycling and fire regulation;
- O. whereas seven out of nine planetary boundaries have been exceeded according to the Stockholm Resilience Centre report entitled ‘Planetary Health Check 2025’¹⁷, including the boundary for climate change;
- P. whereas the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, including floods, wildfires, droughts and heatwaves, is causing devastating humanitarian, economic and environmental damage across the EU, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations, including those living in rural communities, small towns and regions with limited capacity to prepare and recover;

State of the global climate and the need for urgent action ahead of COP31 in Antalya

- 1. Stresses that 2025 was one of the hottest years ever recorded; stresses that each of the last 10 years has ranked among the top 10 hottest years on record; underlines that Europe is the fastest warming continent in the world and, therefore, has a heightened interest in driving ambitious climate action; warns of the severe consequences of the El Niño phenomenon, exacerbated by climate change, predicted to be exceptionally strong in 2026 and 2027, with increasingly severe humanitarian consequences, including for

¹⁵ UN, ‘Secretary-General’s Call to Action on Methane’,
<https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/methane>.

¹⁶ UN, ‘Food loss and waste account for 8-10% of annual global greenhouse gas emissions; cost USD 1 trillion annually’, 30 September 2024,
<https://unfccc.int/news/food-loss-and-waste-account-for-8-10-of-annual-global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-cost-usd-1-trillion>.

¹⁷ Stockholm Resilience Centre, ‘Planetary Health Check 2025’.

food security and water availability¹⁸;

2. Recognises that limiting global warming to 1,5 °C, with no or minimal overshoot, requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions, amounting to a reduction of 43 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035, relative to 2019 levels, reaching net-zero GHG emissions globally by 2050 and net-negative emissions thereafter;
3. Is highly concerned by the fact that, according to the 2025 NDC synthesis report, the full implementation of all newly submitted NDCs, including all conditional elements, would reduce global GHG emissions by only 19 to 24 % by 2035 compared to 2019 levels; recalls the findings of the IPCC in its AR6, which concludes that human influence is unequivocally the dominant driver of observed warming and that the emissions gap between NDCs and the pathway that limits warming to 1,5 °C is wide and continuously increasing;

Global stocktake, NDCs and COP31 in Antalya

4. Regrets that the February 2025 deadline for submitting NDCs setting 2035 targets was missed by the vast majority of parties, including the EU, with only a fraction of parties having submitted their targets by the original deadline; welcomes the fact that, as of COP30 in Belém, 108 countries covering 71 % of global emissions had ultimately submitted new NDCs, while acknowledging that significant gaps remain; calls on all Parties that have yet to submit or update their NDCs to do so without further delay, and to ensure that their NDCs are sufficiently ambitious and aligned with the outcomes of the first global stocktake;
5. Stresses that the implementation of mitigation and response measures related to global stocktake (GST) outcomes takes place within diverse national and regional contexts, and acknowledges the persistent challenges and barriers to implementing the mitigation-related parts of the GST, particularly for developing countries, including technology gaps, capacity constraints, limited access to resources, financing costs and broader structural challenges; stresses, therefore, the importance of locally adapted implementation and accelerated action to overcome these challenges and barriers, including increased international support, both financial and otherwise, directed in particular to developing countries;
6. Underlines the EU's commitment to transition away from fossil fuels, triple renewable energy capacity and double energy efficiency by 2030, as agreed in Dubai at the COP28 and confirmed at the COP30; remains concerned about insufficient progress towards these targets; underlines that it is essential that COP31 builds on them, takes concrete decisions on their implementation and undertakes additional measures to close the ambition gap; calls for the EU, in this regard, to demonstrate leadership by developing a low carbon, energy-efficient economy, including through electrification; urges all countries, in particular major emitters, to join this commitment without delay; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to continue its action through the Global Energy Transition Forum;

¹⁸ Acosta Navarro, J. et al., 'From forecast to risk: an anticipatory analysis of the 2026-27 El Niño', the Commission Joint Research Centre, 2026, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/8279279_JRC147365.

7. Notes, in this regard, that COP31 will mark the start of the process of the next GST; underlines the importance that the next GST be based on the best available science and supports a timeline that would allow the IPCC's seventh assessment report to be integrated into it, and emphasises that the GST framework should incorporate cross-cutting dimensions such as gender equality, human rights, social inclusion and ecosystem protection;
8. Stresses that the adoption of the global Mutirão decision at COP30 was an important step in upholding the multilateral process to combat climate change; regrets, nevertheless, that the commitments made are not sufficient to bridge the gap between projected emissions reductions and those required to reach the targets of the Paris Agreement;
9. Supports, in particular, the establishment of the Global Implementation Accelerator as a concrete mechanism to assist Parties in translating their NDCs and adaptation plans into effective action on the ground; underlines the importance of this mechanism as a meaningful step forward in bridging the gap between political commitments and real-world implementation, and calls on all Parties to engage actively with it and ensure its full operationalisation ahead of the next GST;
10. Stresses that COP31 marks an important implementation phase following the mandates of the GST and that a collective effort and further concrete actions from all Parties are required to close the emissions gap, with major emitters bearing a particular responsibility in this regard;
11. Stresses that the strengthened implementation of the SDGs is a key implementation route for equitable global decarbonisation; reiterates its call for an EU comprehensive strategy for the remaining years of SDG implementation to endeavour to fully achieve the SDGs with concrete actions;
12. Welcomes the proposal of the COP31 Presidency to introduce concrete, measurable and economy-wide transformation targets to close the implementation gap, including by rapidly increasing the share of electrification in final energy demand, significantly reducing waste generation and associated methane emissions, advancing green industrialisation by supporting the circular economy, and substantially improving energy efficiency as a key pillar of climate-neutral and resilient cities; calls on all Parties to make ambitious commitments;
13. Underlines the crucial role played by multilateralism to address the need for urgent action; strongly regrets the decision by the US Government to withdraw, for the second time, from the Paris Agreement; reiterates its call for the United States to reconsider its withdrawal, to contribute its fair share to the global effort to tackle climate change and to support global climate finance in line with the Paris Agreement, especially in regard to its responsibility, based on cumulative past emissions of GHG; calls on all Parties to demonstrate their continued commitment to multilateralism; underlines the particular responsibility and strategic interest of the EU to provide leadership and restore trust in global climate action;
14. Condemns the exclusion of the Republic of Cyprus, a UN member state, by Türkiye from COP31 preparatory meetings and high-level climate-related events in Antalya; considers such discriminatory practices unacceptable and incompatible with the

responsibilities of a country hosting a major UN conference; calls on Türkiye to guarantee the full, equal and unhindered participation of the Republic of Cyprus in all COP31 proceedings and related events, and to refrain from any further attempts to exclude or discriminate against an EU Member State in international multilateral forums dealing with climate issues;

15. Acknowledges that, despite the withdrawal of the United States Government from the Paris Agreement, the overall trajectory of global climate ambition has so far remained stable, with the vast majority of countries maintaining and reinforcing their commitments to the goals of the Agreement; invites US states, cities, regions and non-governmental actors to continue to engage in international climate cooperation, including at the COP, in spite of the withdrawal of the federal government;
16. Recalls its resolution of 17 June 2026 on Türkiye; in the context of Türkiye hosting the COP31, reiterates its strong concern about the Turkish government's deliberate erosion of democracy and the rule of law and its gradual consolidation of an autocratic system leading to questions concerning the participation of political and environmental activists in COP31, including elected officials and opposition politicians, notably the unlawful removal, detention and political case against the Mayor of Istanbul and CHP presidential candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, lawyers, journalists, and human rights defenders, environmental and LGBTIQ+ activists and preventing their participation;

Mitigation

17. Stresses that mitigation, through ambitious and sustained reductions in GHG emissions, must remain at the heart of COP negotiations, and calls on all Parties to ensure that their commitments and actions reflect this important role;
18. Emphasises the need for accelerating action on mitigation, including through advancing the mitigation work programme; underlines the importance that these efforts contribute to actual emission reductions;

Transitioning away from fossil fuels

19. Urges all Parties to deliver on the COP30 agreement to accelerate implementation of the UAE consensus; stresses that the COP30 Presidency initiative on a transitioning away from fossil fuels (TAFF) roadmap and the first international TAFF conference held in Colombia in April 2026 are complementary plurilateral processes, with the ultimate goal of achieving a similar increased level of ambition within UNFCCC proceedings; welcomes the EU submission to the COP30 Presidency roadmap on the TAFF in a just, orderly and equitable manner; urges all Parties to advance the TAFF roadmap and bring it into official COP31 negotiations; calls for stronger political commitments from the Parties on phasing out fossil fuels;
20. Welcomes the outcome of the first TAFF conference held in Santa Marta, Colombia in April 2026 as an important step in climate diplomacy, bringing together 57 countries – representing approximately one third of global GDP – alongside indigenous peoples, civil society and businesses; welcomes, in particular, the launch at the conference of a new international scientific panel to provide dedicated, agile, country-specific analysis in support of the energy transition, complementary to the IPCC; calls for the EU and its Member States to play an active and leading role in advancing the Santa Marta process

ahead of COP31, including by advocating concrete commitments on fossil fuel finance reform, debt relief and debt restructuring, in particular for least developed countries (LDCs), and the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies; highlights, in this regard, the importance of the First Movers Coalition (FMC); calls for the EU to follow up on the outcome of the TAFF conference and coordinate with the FMC ahead of UNFCCC conferences, including through strengthened cooperation and with clear political commitment on pathways and timelines on phasing out fossil fuels and fossil fuels subsidies;

21. Recalls the importance of transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner; calls on the Parties to the UNFCCC to develop a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty and time-bound plans to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and fossil fuel production as soon as possible, and encourages the EU to take a leading role in the negotiations towards such a treaty; calls on all COP Parties to decarbonise their energy systems and halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction;
22. Calls on the Commission to develop and present, as soon as possible, a comprehensive external strategy that supports the global transition away from fossil fuels, including, where appropriate, cooperation with current fossil fuel producing countries and support for economic diversification, in order to support their energy transitions and sustainable development pathways in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement;
23. Emphasises the vulnerabilities caused by the dependency on fossil fuels in a time of global geopolitical instability; underlines the importance of decarbonisation to ensure strategic autonomy;
24. Calls for the EU to lead with good example and to set up a timeline, targets and a strategy for a cross-sectoral and economy-wide phase out of fossil fuels, complementing existing policies;
25. Calls on the Commission to provide data regarding the expected decrease of EU fossil fuel demand and imports over the coming decades, in order to provide greater predictability;
26. Considers that investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, embedded in over 2 500 investment treaties, represent one of the most significant and underappreciated legal barriers to the transition away from fossil fuels and delay the transition towards fossil free energy systems; recalls that the ISDS is frequently being used by multinational energy companies to claim damages for environmental and climate policies such as ending fossil fuels extractions; encourages UNFCCC Parties to remove ISDS provisions from current treaties and to not include such provisions in new agreements; calls for the EU and its Member States at the COP31 to mobilise a collection of Parties to jointly push for a reform of the ISDS;
27. Welcomes the EU's and a number of EU Member States' exit from the Energy Charter Treaty; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to move forward with their individual withdrawals;

International climate finance and sustainable finance

28. Stresses that the gap in global climate finance between what is needed and what is

currently provided is significant and growing, and calls for this gap to be urgently addressed; emphasises that the provision of adequate climate finance is crucial for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; recalls that many developing countries' NDCs are conditional on international climate finance;

29. Notes that the EU and its Member States are the largest providers of public climate finance, providing roughly one third of global public climate finance, with the EU and its Member States providing EUR 31,7 billion from public sources in 2024, and mobilising EUR 11 billion in private finance¹⁹; stresses, however, that existing levels of climate finance remain insufficient to meet the scale of global mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage needs; calls for the EU and the Member States to continue increasing climate finance contributions through the EU and national budgets, particularly in the form of grants and highly concessional finance, and to mobilise private climate finance, while ensuring that climate finance is new and additional to official development assistance; expresses concern about the risk of the NCQG being met by re-categorising other funds, and about the ambiguity around the kinds of funding that contribute to the NCQG, in particular the issue of double-counting;
30. Calls on all Parties to contribute their fair share towards meeting the NCQG, which should include subgoals for finance dedicated to mitigation and adaptation and to loss and damage; calls for the EU and its Member States to scale up new and additional climate finance through a dedicated and predictable EU public finance mechanism, so that the EU delivers its fair share, according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; considers that the NCQG represents the lower boundary for climate finance mobilisation;
31. Stresses that adaptation is underfunded, and that the NCQG does not respond sufficiently to adaptation finance needs; highlights the importance of international public finance, in particular for adaptation and for addressing loss and damage; notes, in this regard, the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025, which estimates the adaptation finance gap at USD 310 to 365 billion annually by 2035, while adaptation finance flows to developing countries remain stagnant;
32. Notes that many climate-vulnerable countries, including several LDCs, are in debt distress or at significant risk of debt distress, which diminishes the effectiveness of international climate finance; reiterates, therefore, that climate finance should be allocated in a way that does not exacerbate their debt burden, giving priority to grant-based finance, and underlines the importance of ensuring that finance is accessible and affordable; calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess their options for contributing to alleviating this debt distress and to take relevant action without delay; stresses that there is consensus across UN bodies that climate finance cannot be scaled up equitably unless the debt crisis is addressed; highlights the importance, in this context, of debt relief instruments;
33. Welcomes the launch of the global climate finance accountability framework at COP30, designed to strengthen transparency, credibility and trust in climate finance delivery; emphasises the importance of robust, harmonised and publicly accessible reporting

¹⁹ Council of the European Union, 'Council publishes 2024 international climate finance figures', 27 October 2025, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/27/council-publishes-2024-international-climate-finance-figures/>.

methodologies to ensure that climate finance commitments are accurately tracked and assessed; calls for clear accounting rules to ensure transparency and distinguish between grants, concessional finance and market-rate loans;

34. Stresses the urgent need to simplify, accelerate and adapt climate finance procedures to the realities of developing countries, in particular by establishing single-window access points, harmonising application criteria and providing technical assistance for project preparation, in order to ensure that climate finance is accessible, rapid and effective for local organisations and communities that are most affected by climate change; highlights the Climate Implementation Bridge announced by the COP31 Presidency as a tool for bridging the gap between climate finance commitments and tangible investments, ensuring that sustainable climate finance solutions can be delivered in a faster and more efficient manner;
35. Reiterates its call to make the operationalisation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement a standing point on COP agendas; calls for the EU to engage in international initiatives, such as the Bridgetown Initiative 3.0; calls for swifter reform of the international financial architecture, and calls on all major international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to assume their role as climate banks and to align their portfolios and lending policies with the Paris Agreement in a way that is financially sustainable in the long term; takes the view that the European Investment Bank should serve as the EU's climate bank;

Adaptation, loss and damage, and just transition

36. Notes with concern that the sixth assessment report of the IPCC estimates that approximately 3,3 to 3,6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change;
37. Underlines the need to step up climate adaptation, resilience and preparedness within the EU and globally in order to minimise the negative effects of climate change and biodiversity loss; stresses that climate adaptation depends on healthy ecosystems and underlines the need for ecosystem-based adaptation, as well as the urgency of developing comprehensive strategies to prevent, manage and recover from extreme weather events such as wildfires, droughts, heatwaves and floods, while ensuring equitable access to adequate financial and technical support in order to do so;
38. Reiterates its deep concern about the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in the EU and globally, and their impact on human health and lives; stresses that the costs of adaptation will increase with inaction and delayed action, in terms of both mitigation and adaptation; recognises the importance of global cooperation and the exchange of know-how and of the best available science and best practices in climate adaptation, while emphasising the important role of local and regional authorities in designing and implementing these actions as best adapted to the local context; calls for increased investment in early warning systems and risk management systems in vulnerable regions;
39. Underlines the importance of strengthening bilateral and regional partnerships for climate resilience, innovative solutions, sustainable infrastructure, resilient food systems, efficient water management and knowledge-sharing, while promoting local ownership and capacity-building;

40. Recognises, in particular, the impacts of climate change on small island states, many of which are located in the Pacific region, and the huge adaptation challenges faced by these nations; notes that sea levels are expected to rise more quickly throughout this century in all IPCC scenarios; recognises the leadership role played by small island states in the development of the Paris Agreement and the implementation of its framework;
41. Stresses the importance of considering, in this context, the issue of human mobility, including migratory flows and displacement, and the need to take measures that reduce displacement risk, strengthen resilience, support anticipatory action and early warning systems, and enable people to stay safely where possible, move safely and with dignity when necessary, and access protection and assistance when displacement occurs;
42. Welcomes the adoption of indicators and the progress made on the operationalisation of the global goal on adaptation, as agreed at COP30; urges all Parties to advance work on operationalising these indicators to track global resilience, and to deliver on the agreed goal of tripling climate adaptation finance by 2035; calls for work to continue at COP31 on the operationalisation and implementation of the global goal on adaptation;
43. Calls on Parties that have not yet done so to put in place and submit their national adaptation plans (NAPs) as soon as possible; calls on all Parties to progress towards the implementation of their NAPs by 2030 and to include a focus on nature-based solutions;
44. Expresses its high expectation for the upcoming European integrated framework for climate resilience and risk management; calls for a proposal that reflects the realities of the climate risks faced by Europe in a scenario that overshoots global warming of 1,5 °C, and includes a strong emphasis on nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches;
45. Reiterates its call for loss and damage to be a standing agenda item at COP meetings; welcomes the operationalisation of the fund for responding to loss and damage (FRDL); expresses concern about the very low financing of the FRDL, including undelivered pledges, and calls for the rapid scaling-up of predictable, adequate and accessible finance; calls on all Parties to ensure that resources directed to the fund are additional to current climate finance contributions;
46. Expresses concern over Türkiye's instrumentalisation of its role as the COP31 host country to politically promote the illegal secessionist entity in the occupied area of Cyprus, including through the invitation extended to the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community; stresses that all COP31 proceedings must fully respect international law, relevant UN Security Council resolutions, notably Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and the applicable UNFCCC rules and procedures;
47. Calls on all Parties to advance the just transition work programme by promoting concrete actions to address inequalities that climate change is known to exacerbate and to ensure a comprehensive effectiveness review; welcomes the COP30 decision to establish the Just Transition Mechanism and calls on all Parties to deliver on the operationalisation of this mechanism during COP31; underlines that climate action and social inequalities must be addressed together, including through measures to support the transition into green jobs and decent work creation, reskilling and upskilling, and

access to social safety networks; calls on all Parties to promote social dialogue with employers' and workers' organisations and stakeholder engagement as a basis for forging a strong social consensus;

48. Stresses that climate change is threatening the fundamental rights and well-being of children and young people; highlights the need to integrate child rights and intergenerational equity into all aspects of climate policy, including adaptation, mitigation, loss and damage, and climate finance;
49. Stresses the importance of ensuring access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters, in line with the Aarhus Convention, as critical to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement; believes that the EU and the Member States should lead by example and apply the findings of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, while respecting their own international commitments under the Aarhus Convention and the rule of law;

EU climate policy aligned with the Paris Agreement

50. Highlights the fact that the EU is currently on course to reduce net GHG emissions by only around 54 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, even if the Member States fully implement existing and planned national measures and EU policies; notes that preliminary data from Eurostat shows that the EU's emissions increased by 1 % between 2024 and 2025; calls on the Member States to take the necessary measures to address this gap, and, in this regard, on the Commission to take additional measures to support the Member States in their efforts;
51. Welcomes the adoption of the binding EU 2040 climate target set by the amending act to the European Climate Law; underlines that all EU policies need to be aligned with the Paris Agreement and guided by scientific advice, particularly as provided by the IPCC and the ESABCC;
52. Reiterates the need to integrate climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures implementing them, and underlines that Articles 6(2) and 6(4) of the European Climate Law oblige the Commission to assess whether all current measures, draft measures and legislative proposals, including budgetary proposals, are consistent with the EU's climate targets; recalls that according to the European Climate Law, the EU's and Member States' actions should be guided by the precautionary and 'polluter pays' principles established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and should also take into account the 'energy efficiency first' principle of the Energy Union and the 'do no harm' principle of the European Green Deal;
53. Is concerned that the EU is off course when it comes to the legally binding targets for 2040 and 2050, as set out in the EU Climate Law, with projections of current and planned measures only reaching a 69 % and 78 % reduction by 2040 and 2050, respectively²⁰;
54. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take urgent action to close this gap; further calls on the Commission to present robust legislative proposals constituting a

²⁰ European Environment Agency Report 09/2025, 'Monitoring report on progress towards the 8th EAP objectives 2025', 10 December 2025.

framework to achieve the 2040 target, appropriately reflecting the elements in Article 4(5) of the European Climate Law;

55. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that both the national energy and climate plans and long-term strategies of the Member States include sufficient action and financial means to achieve EU targets for 2030 and beyond;
56. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to show leadership in view of the next GST in 2028, and to avoid any situation in which the EU cannot provide a clear target for its NDC in advance of the deadline; expects the Council to submit an updated NDC in the light of the legislative framework for achieving the EU 2040 target; underscores the need for the EU to meet UNFCCC deadlines in order to uphold the UNFCCC process and lead internationally by example;
57. Recognises the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) as a cornerstone of EU climate policy; urges the Commission and the Member States to maintain their support for an ETS that ensures climate integrity and aligns with EU climate targets;
58. Calls on the Commission to ensure that international industrial partnerships, clean technology cooperation and strategic raw materials partnerships are fully aligned with climate objectives and contribute to a just global transition, while supporting local value creation and sustainable development in partner countries;
59. Highlights the importance of science-based decision-making; calls for the EU to enhance its exchanges with climate scientists and the broader scientific community;
60. Recognises the vulnerability of the EU and global economies to energy price shocks and supply disruptions, driven by dependence on fossil fuels and volatile oil and gas markets; underlines, therefore, the urgent need to accelerate the energy transition by deploying clean technologies at scale, which also necessitates the prioritisation of research and innovation through investment in education and academic research in the field of energy and decarbonisation; calls for the EU and the Member States to strengthen support for research centres and universities working in this area; underlines that the transition to a low-carbon economy must be accompanied by deliberate and adequately resourced efforts to develop innovation, skills and knowledge;
61. Underlines the strategic role of public procurement as a powerful lever for accelerating decarbonisation and advancing both mitigation and adaptation; calls for the EU and its Member States to systematically integrate ambitious environmental and climate criteria into public procurement, favouring low and zero carbon, energy-efficient and climate-resilient solutions across all sectors of public expenditure; stresses that procurement frameworks should be sufficiently agile and flexible to respond to the pace and scale of the green transition;
62. Underlines the role of the ESABCC, as established by the European Climate Law; calls on the Commission to provide justification, in impact assessment reports or other publicly accessible documents, of deviations from the ESABCC's advice and to address the policy trade-offs; calls on the Commission, moreover, to safeguard sufficient funding for the ESABCC in upcoming budgetary proposals to enable it to fulfil its legal mandate;

63. Recalls the provisions set out in the EU Climate Law concerning the possible use of high-quality international credits under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to achieve the EU's 2040 target; stresses the need for setting high-quality standards, including to ensure transparency, climate integrity, additionality and the avoidance of double counting, both at EU and global levels;
64. Looks forward to the upcoming Circular Economy Act; stresses the importance of not overlooking resource depletion, waste, underutilisation, and stock depletion embedded in linear materials management; notes that structural value loss needs to become more visible in economic decision-making;
65. Stresses that the credibility of the EU's international climate commitments depends on adequate financial resources under the next multiannual financial framework (MFF); calls for climate, environment and biodiversity objectives to remain a central component of the next MFF, including through an ambitious climate mainstreaming target across EU expenditure and external action instruments;
66. Calls for the future Global Europe instrument to support climate adaptation, resilience-building and biodiversity protection, particularly in LDCs and climate-vulnerable regions, while maintaining poverty reduction as one of the core objectives of EU external action;

Triple planetary crisis: climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution

67. Underscores that the climate, biodiversity and pollution crises are interlinked and that the responses to each need to be aligned; emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems, and the need to manage natural resources sustainably, and within planetary boundaries, which is an approach that results in multiple shared benefits; stresses that nature-based solutions, including the protection and restoration of forests, wetlands and peatlands, must be fully recognised and integrated into climate strategies as cost-effective tools for mitigation and adaptation, delivering multiple co-benefits for biodiversity, communities and climate resilience;
68. Recalls the importance of environmental policies being designed and implemented in full alignment with the One Health approach, which is an integrated, unifying approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimise the health of people, animals and ecosystems;
69. Stresses the need to address the interlinkages between climate change, air pollution and public health in a comprehensive manner, including at the COP; recognises the importance of the COP28 Declaration on Climate and Health, signed by over 150 governments; calls for air quality improvements to be integrated into climate policies and considered in NDCs; calls on all Parties to accelerate meaningful action contributing to air quality; urges the Parties to ensure that climate finance prioritises clean air solutions with measurable benefits for health, equity and climate;
70. Stresses that climate change will contribute to increased antimicrobial resistance; reiterates, in this regard, the need for urgent action to tackle antimicrobial resistance and calls for further efforts by all Parties to achieve a reduction in and more prudent use of antimicrobials to combat the risk of resistance; calls, in this regard, for binding

commitments in relevant international treaties; regrets the lack of action taken so far;

71. Deplores the high costs of chemical pollution worldwide, which is worsening the climate and biodiversity crises; calls on the Parties to implement measures to meet the strategic objectives and targets adopted under the UN Global Framework on Chemicals (GFC); underlines the need for the EU and its Member States to spearhead global efforts to tackle chemical pollution, including per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), and revise their policies on chemicals, where necessary; highlights the potential of the upcoming First International Conference of the Global Framework on Chemicals in strengthening further international cooperation on the sound management of chemicals and pollution prevention; calls for accelerated action under the GFC to deliver its comprehensive plan and advance towards a planet free of harm from chemicals and waste;
72. Calls on all Parties to mainstream nature-based solutions into their national adaptation plans, recognising the critical role of ecosystem protection and restoration, including of forests, wetlands, coastal ecosystems and peatlands, in achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement and enhancing long-term climate resilience; calls for stronger integration between climate action, biodiversity protection, including wild animal populations, and land restoration policies in the implementation of international environmental agreements;
73. Highlights the importance of identifying and maximising potential synergies between biodiversity and climate action, including the protection, restoration and management of ecosystems and species important in carbon cycles; stresses the importance of implementing the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF); welcomes, in this regard, the submission of updated national biodiversity strategies and action plans by 97 Parties and of 7th national reports by 134 Parties and urges all remaining Parties to follow suit swiftly;
74. Recalls the importance of the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector in meeting the EU's climate and biodiversity targets; recalls that the Nature Restoration Regulation is one of the EU's tools for meeting its targets under the LULUCF Regulation²¹ and its international biodiversity obligations, notably the Kunming-Montreal GBF;
75. Stresses the important role of forests in climate action; stresses, in this regard, the importance of global efforts to combat deforestation, as forests provide one of the largest carbon sinks in the world and are essential reservoirs in terms of biodiversity; highlights the urgent need to protect the world's most vital forest territories, including in the EU's outermost regions, and the wild animal populations they shelter; reaffirms the EU's commitment to the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use (COP26); underlines that the increasing frequency and severity of wildfires represent a growing threat to forest ecosystems, biodiversity and rural communities worldwide; calls on all parties to integrate wildfire prevention and forest resilience into their NDCs,

²¹ Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/841/oj>).

where relevant, and national adaptation plans, recognising sustainable forest management and reforestation as essential tools for both climate mitigation and disaster risk reduction; calls on all Parties to set targets to increase net removals of CO₂ equivalent through LULUCF activities;

76. Expresses great concern that, according to the UN, hundreds of human rights defenders are killed every year, with land and environmental defenders being at specific risk; stresses the need to support and protect environmental defenders and to hold accountable those who cause them harm²²;
77. Emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water-related ecosystems, and of using water sustainably; highlights the devastating environmental, social and economic impacts of desertification, droughts, floods and water pollution; welcomes the European water resilience strategy and calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly implement it; calls, in this regard, on the Member States to fully implement all EU water legislation;
78. Underscores the critical importance of wetlands – including peatlands, mangroves and other coastal and inland wetland ecosystems – as some of the planet’s most effective natural carbon sinks; calls on all the Parties to urgently scale up efforts to conserve, sustainably manage and restore wetlands as a central strategy for climate mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity protection and the sustainability of related social and economic activities;
79. Emphasises that soil is the largest terrestrial carbon store and plays an indispensable role in the global climate cycle; welcomes all efforts by governments and non-governmental organisations to maximise the potential of soils to mitigate climate change and improve water availability; underlines, in this regard, the Soil Monitoring Law, which serves to improve the capacities of the Member States and help the EU meet its international commitments;
80. Stresses the need to combat plastic pollution; regrets that negotiations on a global plastics treaty have repeatedly failed to produce an agreement; calls for the adoption of an ambitious agreement that addresses all stages of plastic production, consumption and waste management; stresses the need for adequate carbon pricing of raw materials to significantly reduce fossil fuels in the plastics sector; calls for decisive action to address plastic pollution as an interconnected threat to ocean health and climate resilience;
81. Notes that a global wildlife for climate action declaration will be launched at COP31, aiming to formally integrate wildlife conservation into global climate policy;

Oceans and seas

82. Welcomes the entry into force of the BBNJ Agreement on 17 January 2026 and calls for its swift ratification by all parties; looks forward to an ambitious first Conference of the Parties (COP1) for the BBNJ Agreement in early 2027; calls on the parties to continue work on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue; calls on the Council to adopt a

²² [UN Special Rapporteur’s Report on the Killing of Human Rights Defenders](#), 24 December 2020.

general approach on the BBNJ Directive²³;

83. Stresses that climate mechanisms, including absorption of carbon dioxide, capture of excess heat and oxygen creation, depend on the health of the ocean and marine ecosystems that are currently affected by global warming, pollution, overexploitation of marine biodiversity, acidification, eutrophication, deoxygenation and coastal erosion; recognises that oceans are an essential reservoir for biodiversity and the planet's greatest natural ally in the fight against climate change, absorbing approximately 30 % of carbon emissions since the industrial revolution and around 90 % of the excess heat generated by GHG emissions; stresses, however, that this capacity has limits, and that warming waters, acidification, oxygen loss, plastic pollution and habitat destruction are advancing simultaneously, requiring a comprehensive approach that goes well beyond traditional conservation efforts;
84. Welcomes the growing recognition of the ocean-climate nexus in international climate negotiations, including the progress made through the UNFCCC Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue, and the inclusion of oceans and coasts as a thematic pillar of the COP30 Action Agenda and the first High-Level Ocean Ministerial held in Belém; calls for this momentum to be carried forward and deepened at COP31 in Antalya;
85. Underlines that scaling transformative ocean-climate solutions, including the decarbonisation of global shipping and maritime transport, offshore renewable energy, sustainable 'blue' foods, and the protection and restoration of blue carbon ecosystems, could provide up to 35 % of the emissions reductions needed²⁴ to meet the Paris Agreement and keep warming below 1,5 °C; regrets that ocean-based climate solutions remain vastly underused in global climate policy and finance, and calls for this imbalance to be urgently addressed; calls on the COP31 Presidency to ensure that oceans are firmly embedded across all relevant agenda items at Antalya, including across the Action Agenda, and to encourage the appointment of Ocean Champions to build consensus;
86. Supports the Blue NDC Challenge and its goal of encouraging countries to integrate ocean-based climate solutions into national climate plans, and welcomes the launch of the Blue NDC Implementation Taskforce as a concrete step towards translating political ambition into national action;
87. Stresses the importance of achieving the GBF 30x30 conservation target, which seeks to place at least 30 % of the world's land and marine areas under effective protection by 2030, and calls for adequate and predictable financing mechanisms to support its implementation, particularly in the most ocean-dependent and climate-vulnerable nations;
88. Notes the growing scientific evidence regarding the particular contribution of whale

²³ Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (COM(2025)0173).

²⁴ Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Eliza Northrop et al., *The Ocean as a Solution to Climate Change: Updated Opportunities for Action*, prepared for the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy (Ocean Panel), World Resources Institute, 2023.

populations to healthy ocean ecosystems and natural carbon sequestration processes²⁵; notes with concern that, despite decades of conservation efforts, many whale species remain endangered or vulnerable and continue to face multiple cumulative pressures from human activity and climate change; calls on the Parties to take all relevant protection measures and to support science-based conservation initiatives aimed at restoring whale populations to a favourable conservation status;

The rights of indigenous peoples

89. Stresses the need to protect the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and local communities as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; stresses the need to ensure the right to free, prior and informed consent; stresses that all projects under Article 6 thereof affecting indigenous lands or communities must involve indigenous peoples and respect their rights;
90. Underlines that indigenous peoples are rights holders recognised in the preamble to the Paris Agreement; stresses the need for the political participation of indigenous peoples at the COPs and in other UNFCCC processes to promote meaningful engagement in all decision-making bodies; acknowledges the need to fund and facilitate the presence of indigenous peoples at the COPs and subsidiary body technical meetings;
91. Recognises that indigenous lands are biodiversity hotspots and that indigenous peoples play a vital role in conservation and the sustainable management of resources; recalls that, according to the fifth assessment report of the IPCC, indigenous, local and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for adapting to climate change; recognises the importance of indigenous knowledge and underlines in particular the role of this knowledge in avoiding maladaptation;
92. Stresses the need for indigenous peoples to have direct access to climate finance through international climate funds such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the FRDL;

Climate, peace and security

93. Welcomes the fact that increased focus has been given to the climate, peace and security agenda at COP meetings, particularly evident at COP29 with the launch of the Baku call on climate action for peace, relief and recovery, and with the previous COP27 initiative entitled ‘climate responses for sustaining peace’ and the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace; underscores the importance of addressing the climate-security nexus;
94. Recognises that climate change is a threat to international peace and security, as its impacts, including extreme weather events, droughts, and food and water insecurity, can worsen current political tensions, increase competition over natural resources, and undermine the foundations of stable governance, particularly in regions already affected by fragility and conflict;

²⁵ Pearson et al. (2023) – [Whales in the carbon cycle: can recovery remove carbon dioxide?](#)
UN, Sustainable Development Goals web page on the [Oceanic Blue Carbon Voluntary Commitment](#).

95. Stresses that climate change and environmental degradation are threat multipliers that threaten ecosystem services and can lead to scarcity of natural resources and food shortages, increase tensions in international relations and conflicts over natural resources, cause climate- and environment-related disasters, affect human security and exacerbate current vulnerabilities, and contribute to instability, insecurity and conflict risks, including by increasing the risk of displacement and migration;
96. Stresses the need for increased international attention to be paid to the environmental impacts of conflicts; highlights the environmental devastation caused by military assaults and operations around the world and urges the cessation of these activities in line with international law; stresses that beyond the immediate destruction and loss of human lives, ongoing conflicts disrupt ecosystems, deplete natural resources, pollute the environment and jeopardise the health of our planet for generations to come, while undermining climate mitigation and adaptation efforts; believes that entities recognised as being responsible for conflicts by the International Court of Justice must also be held accountable for the climate and environmental costs of war and occupation and post-conflict reconstruction;
97. Stresses that continued dependence on fossil fuels is a vulnerability and, when used as a weapon of war, can cause disruptions to important infrastructure and price shocks for energy and fuel, as shown by the current geopolitical situation;
98. Notes that reducing fossil dependency is the best way to lessen inflationary pressure, while also acting as a security measure;
99. Emphasises that the transition away from fossil fuels should be regarded not only as an environmental necessity but also as a long-term peace and security strategy, capable of reducing exposure to geopolitical risks, energy price shocks and conflicts linked to the control of fossil resources;
100. Recognises that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and also the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East have demonstrated with devastating clarity the strategic vulnerability that energy dependence on fossil fuels represents for the EU and its citizens; underlines, in particular, the latest UNEP reports on the frightening extent of environmental damage caused by the conflicts in both Ukraine²⁶ and Gaza²⁷; recalls, furthermore, the Joint Research Centre report on the environmental damage caused by Russia's ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine²⁸; underlines that the systematic targeting of energy infrastructure in Ukraine has had catastrophic consequences for civilian populations, and that this reality must inform the EU's approach to energy resilience as a matter of critical infrastructure protection;
101. Stresses that strengthened climate diplomacy under the UNFCCC is key to contributing to reaffirming multilateralism, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions and declining trust in global cooperation;

²⁶ UN Environment Programme, *The Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine: A Preliminary Review*, 14 October 2022.

²⁷ UN Environment Programme, *Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Gaza: Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impacts*, 18 June 2024.

²⁸ Joint Research Centre, *Status of Environment and Climate in Ukraine*, 2025.

Efforts across all sectors

102. Stresses that all sectors must contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions and to achieving climate neutrality in line with the Paris Agreement;
103. Recalls that methane has over 80 times the warming power of carbon dioxide in its first 20 years in the atmosphere; welcomes the fact that almost 160 countries have become signatories to the Global Methane Pledge and urges those EU Member States that have not yet joined the Pledge to do so; calls for a quantified, science-based assessment of the progress made since its adoption at COP26; calls on all Parties to also include specific methane reduction targets in their NDCs; calls on the Commission to continue with its efforts under the Global Methane Pledge and with the implementation of the Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap; highlights the effectiveness of buyers' club initiatives such as the FMC in reducing harmful emissions; calls, therefore, for the EU to take the lead in the establishment of a methane reduction buyers' club, similar to the FMC, to accelerate the global reduction of methane;
104. Stresses that cutting methane emissions from oil and gas operations is one of the fastest, most cost-effective and immediately available ways to reduce GHG emissions; reiterates the importance of reducing methane emissions in the fossil fuel supply chains globally during the transition to clean energy systems, in order to reach a global reduction of 75 % of methane emissions by 2030 as set out in the Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA); recalls that Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector boosts transparency on methane emission imports and fair competition with non-EU countries; stresses that any implementation challenges need to be urgently addressed to ensure the regulation's effective and timely application;
105. Notes that the agricultural sector accounted for 10-12 % of global anthropogenic emissions and 11 % of total EU emissions in 2020; acknowledges the significant potential for GHG emission reductions in the agricultural and agri-food sectors; stresses that farmers and the agricultural sector are particularly vulnerable to climate change, with climate change posing a significant threat to food security worldwide; stresses that policies to achieve emission reductions in the agricultural sector should do the utmost to guarantee food security; stresses the need to implement a policy framework that incentivises sustainable farming methods and supports farmers, particularly small-scale farmers, in the shift to resilient practices, and that rewards farmers who support mitigation efforts and protect biodiversity; highlights the environmental benefits of rewetting drained peatlands, and other measures that promote on-farm biodiversity, soil health and water quality while contributing to climate mitigation and adaptation;
106. Highlights the potential of reducing emissions by tackling food waste; calls for advancing the Food Waste Breakthrough initiative launched at COP30; recognises that preventing food waste represents one of the most cost-efficient and immediate mitigation opportunities available across all sectors of the economy;
107. Notes the increasing scientific and political attention being given to climate engineering approaches, including methods such as solar radiation modification (SRM), which aim to artificially alter the Earth's climate system through techniques such as stratospheric aerosol injection; stresses that such approaches do not address the root causes of climate change, such as GHG emissions, and that their potential impacts remain highly

uncertain, posing serious risks to environmental integrity, human rights, and global geopolitical stability; emphasises that, in the absence of robust scientific evidence regarding safety, effectiveness and governance, any pursuit of climate engineering must be guided by the precautionary principle; recalls the recommendations of the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors of the Commission published in December 2024; calls on the Commission to take a proactive role in negotiating a global governance framework for SRM based on a firm stance of non-deployment, and to strengthen the EU's capability to detect and quantify any undeclared deployment of SRM; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to support responsible scientific research and the comprehensive international assessment of the effects and impacts of this technology, ensuring that any public funding for SRM research is additional to, and not a substitute for, public funding for research in adaptation and mitigation;

108. Notes with concern that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990 and that steeper reductions will be needed to meet the EU's climate goals; stresses the importance of further measures to support the electrification of road transport as a way of reducing road transport emissions, alongside the expansion of rail transport, and in conjunction with further measures supporting the modal shift, intermodal transport and public transport in general; is concerned by the fact that the Commission's 2025 national energy and climate plan assessment report showed that some Member States still have support schemes in place for fossil-fuel powered vehicles and calls on those Member States to phase them out; notes with concern that EU emissions from international aviation and maritime transport are projected to continue to rise;
109. Stresses the need for the aviation sector to align with global climate goals, particularly the 1,5 °C target set by the Paris Agreement; is concerned by the slow progress achieved by the International Civil Aviation Organization in addressing emissions from international aviation; considers that the level of ambition of its Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) should be increased to align with the 1,5 °C trajectory;
110. Welcomes the agreement reached at the 83rd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 83) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in April 2025, which established, for the first time, a global carbon pricing mechanism for international shipping through the IMO Net-Zero Framework, combining a GHG fuel standard with a pricing and reward mechanism; deeply regrets, however, that the extraordinary MEPC session in October 2025 failed to formally adopt the IMO Net-Zero Framework; calls on the EU Member States to push for the adoption of the framework without further delay, while stressing that the framework alone is unlikely to be sufficient to align international shipping with the 1,5 °C trajectory; highlights, in this regard, the role of the EU ETS;
111. Reiterates its call on the Commission to ensure the social fairness of transport decarbonisation measures, including by incorporating emissions from superyachts, private jets and business planes into EU climate policies; reiterates, furthermore, its call on all the Parties, including the EU Member States, to take measures to discourage the use of private jets; highlights the disproportionate climate impact of private jets, which are up to 14 times more polluting per passenger than commercial flights; underlines the importance of leading by example and urges all participants attending COP31, including those from the EU institutions, to refrain from using private jets and to choose the least

polluting transport option possible to reach their destination²⁹;

112. Welcomes the fact that, according to the World Bank, nearly 30 % of global emissions are now covered by carbon pricing³⁰; regrets, nevertheless, that both the coverage and the average pricing levels remain far too low to meet the temperature goals set in the Paris Agreement;
113. Highlights the effectiveness of the EU ETS as a climate measure that also delivers investment security for frontrunners of the green transition, strengthening the EU's global competitiveness; invites the Commission to further encourage and support other Parties in introducing or improving carbon pricing mechanisms, and to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms outside the EU; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that any links between the EU ETS and other carbon pricing schemes will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU's domestic GHG emissions commitments;
114. Stresses that the GST highlights the importance of transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, including through a more circular economy; stresses the need to intensify efforts to develop and improve the EU's circular economy;
115. Stresses the need to address the climate and environmental impacts of the textile sector, which is responsible for around 8-10 % of global GHG emissions and substantial consumption of resources, particularly water and energy; reiterates that the textile industry needs to play an important role in the shift to a circular economy and to tackle challenges related to waste prevention, waste management, microplastic shedding, water usage, overproduction, ultra-fast and fast-fashion practices, the overall durability and non-toxicity of the production process, and recyclability in the textile sector; highlights, in this regard, the importance of the recent amendment to the EU Waste Framework Directive³¹; stresses the need to urgently improve human rights standards throughout the textile value chain;
116. Stresses the impact of climate change on the tourism sector, as both a contributor and a vulnerable sector, and the need for destinations to adapt to climate risks and to develop climate-resilient tourism; calls for the promotion of a shift to more sustainable tourism, with environmentally responsible and low-carbon practices;
117. Underlines that the transition to a low-carbon economy can stimulate innovation, foster the emergence of new industrial ecosystems, reduce dependencies, create high-value jobs and support long-term sustainable growth across the EU; stresses that climate ambition should be accompanied by measures supporting the green transition and industrial competitiveness; calls for strong and targeted measures to prevent the risk of

²⁹ European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29) (OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj>).

³⁰ World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026, World Bank, Washington DC, May 2026

³¹ Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/oj>).

carbon leakage and unfair global competition; calls, furthermore, for a workable WTO compatible export solution to address the risk of carbon leakage for goods covered by the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism exported from the EU to non-EU countries, ensuring a global level playing field; calls on the Parties to introduce robust transparency and accountability provisions to address this risk;

118. Expresses concern over the increasing energy demand and GHG emissions associated with data centres and digital infrastructure, driven by accelerated digitalisation, artificial intelligence (AI) deployment, and growing data storage and processing needs; stresses that without regulatory measures, efficiency gains and clean energy deployment risk being outpaced by absolute growth in electricity consumption, as is projected in a number of Member States;

Climate change and gender

119. Recognises the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls, worsening gender inequalities and posing unique threats to their livelihoods, health and safety; underlines the importance of building knowledge of and systematically analysing this differentiated impact;
120. Underscores the importance of gender perspectives and inclusive approaches in the UNFCCC process, including the Just Transition Work Programme;
121. Reiterates that adaptive capacity and vulnerability differ across gender, age, ability, race and occupation; calls, therefore, on all the Parties to assess, respond to and prioritise the needs of vulnerable populations in their national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and NDCs;
122. Emphasises the need for ensuring full, meaningful and equal participation of women and girls in decision-making; stresses the importance of gender equality as a cross-cutting theme across climate interventions and of adopting a gender-responsive approach to climate policy, taking into account how decisions may impact women and men, boys and girls;
123. Welcomes the Belém gender action plan for 2026-2034 and its new framework for gender-responsive climate policy, and calls on all the Parties to take concrete actions to deliver on the commitments therein; urges the Member States and the Commission to increase efforts to achieve the goals set out in the EU gender action plan III;
124. Reiterates the importance of increasing women's participation in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context, including in COP delegations and in leadership at all levels of climate action; calls on all the Parties to aim for gender parity in their delegations and at all levels of climate change decision-making and negotiations; urges all the Parties to nominate a national gender and climate change focal point and to increase the associated resources, training and support, including within the EU;

Conflicts of interest, transparency and integrity

125. Urges the UNFCCC and the Parties to take the lead in proposing an ambitious, transparent, accountability framework that would protect the UNFCCC's work from undue influence, based on the model contained in the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control with regard to the tobacco industry;

commends the progress made in this regard by the Commission, which did not allocate any access badges to fossil fuel lobbyists during COP29 and COP30 and calls for this effort to continue at COP31; calls on the Member States to follow this example and to not include fossil fuel lobbyists or lobbyists for industry associations representing the fossil fuel industry within their national delegations to COP31;

126. Welcomes the fact that all non-government participants were expected, for the first time at COP30, to publicly disclose who is funding their participation and to confirm that their individual objectives are aligned with those of the UNFCCC; regrets, however, that this requirement did not apply to non-government participants who received government badges;
127. Is concerned by the increasing spread of climate misinformation and disinformation, including by state actors, and urges all governments to address this as a matter of urgency in view of the threat this poses to both meaningful climate action and democracy; highlights the importance of access to science-based information and of safeguarding independent media; stresses the importance of the work conducted by the IPCC to provide sound scientific advice and data; calls on the UNFCCC to intensify efforts to combat climate disinformation; calls for the EU to join the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change to fight climate disinformation; calls on the Parties to increase funding for the IPCC and UNFCCC in order to tackle climate disinformation and misinformation;

Participation of stakeholders at COP31

128. Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all parties and stakeholders in the UNFCCC decision-making process in the spirit of sincere collaboration, and recognises that protecting space for civil society and local- and regional-level actors to operate and participate in climate governance is fundamental to accountability and transparency; acknowledges that there are many barriers to the participation of civil society organisations at COPs; stresses that civil society and local- and regional-level actors play a vital role in advancing the implementation of NDCs by ensuring actions are effective, locally tailored and responsive to community needs;
129. Calls on the COP31 presidency and future presidencies to better enable the participation of developing countries and delegates from LDCs and to allocate additional resources to this end; encourages the Parties to include young people in their delegations to ensure that future generations have an active role in shaping decisions that affect their future; welcomes the creation of the youth climate champion role at COP28 as a step towards the stronger inclusion of young people in the UNFCCC process; calls for COP31 to institutionalise the meaningful participation of children and young people, including through structured dialogue mechanisms and official representation; calls for the increased use of virtual platforms at COPs to enhance the global inclusiveness and participation of delegates and civil society representatives;
130. Condemns the Turkish Government's intensified crackdown on civil society – notably on environmental rights defenders and peaceful protesters, including the recent attack on the LGBTIQ+ community – ahead of both the July NATO summit as well as COP31, through arbitrary arrests, criminal prosecutions, ill treatment and restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression; reminds the Government of Türkiye of its obligation, as a host of COP31, to facilitate the participation and protection of civil

society;

131. Demands, as in previous COPs, that the organisers of all future COPs ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms, full and unrestricted participation for citizens and civil society organisations and equitable access to this and future COPs are fully enshrined and guaranteed in all host country agreements, and calls for these agreements to be made public as soon as possible after signing; reiterates its call on the UNFCCC Secretariat to develop human rights criteria that countries hosting future COPs must commit to meeting as part of the host country agreement, and urges the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in this process³²;

Competitiveness and industry

132. Believes that EU companies are at the forefront of climate adaptation technologies and have an important role to play globally in providing adaptation-related services, products and technologies;
133. Calls for improved access to public and private finance for EU industries and companies, including for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to decarbonise in line with the Paris Agreement and continue the energy transition while enhancing their competitiveness;
134. Recognises the essential role of SMEs and small mid-cap enterprises in the digital and green transitions, given their innovation and cutting-edge technological solutions at global level; stresses the need for a highly skilled, future-ready workforce and for adequate training programmes that enable these companies to attract and retain such talent; underlines their need for predictable rules and better access to finance;
135. Supports the establishment of the Just Transition Mechanism at global level, as included in the Belém Declaration, in order to protect industries, workers and communities in countries struggling to shift to clean, sustainable and affordable energy sources and to develop a climate-resilient future; draws attention to the need to define how the Just Transition Mechanism should be created, how it should function and who the beneficiaries would be at global level;
136. Stresses the need for global coordination with and support for LDCs and small island developing states to reach climate neutrality and build capacity through cross-border cooperation in the fields of policymaking and science and technology transfer; considers that this cooperation should be conducted in full respect of the principles of energy efficiency and technological neutrality;
137. Stresses that ensuring an inclusive and socially fair transition to climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest requires policies that are practical, cost-effective and deliverable, that prioritise the fastest scalable emissions reductions capable of maintaining public support, industrial competitiveness and economic resilience, and that should ensure a first-mover advantage in clean technologies and sustainable industries;
138. Believes that the EU's objective to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest while enhancing its competitiveness can only be reached through deep and gradual industrial

³² 21 November 2023, UN Climate Change Conference 2023 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (COP28).

transformation; underlines that investing in industrial value chains for home-grown, affordable net-zero technologies, raw materials, innovation, skills and infrastructure within the EU is essential to support such a transformation and to increase the EU's strategic autonomy; stresses that publicly supported technologies must demonstrate a credible pathway towards substantial cost reductions at scale within realistic timeframes; underlines the importance of digital technologies in supporting industrial transformation;

139. Highlights the important role that can be played by carbon capture, utilisation and storage as a complementary tool in the decarbonisation of hard-to-abate industrial emissions in sectors that cannot rely substantially on electrification; underlines also the important role of low-carbon products, including low-carbon hydrogen; stresses that these should be used where they deliver substantial emissions reductions;
140. Looks forward to fruitful discussions at the COP31 on how best to ensure stable and sustainable supply chains of critical minerals at global level;

Energy

141. Takes note of the Commission-led Electrify Now initiative launched on 23 June 2026; believes that electrification can play a key role in supporting the implementation of climate policies, economic growth and energy security; urges all the Parties to accelerate their efforts in this regard;
142. Welcomes the adoption of the EU Electrification Action Plan, and calls on the Commission to propose an ambitious EU-wide electrification target in addition to ambitious EU targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency;
143. Supports the Global Energy Storage and Grids Pledge to increase energy storage six-fold to 1 500 GW by 2030 as supported at the COP29, including by the G7 countries, and promoted by the IEA in order to increase the rate of development of renewable energies, which will require the better integration of high volumes of variable renewable power and time-shift renewable power to match demand; recognises that this growth in storage is necessary for grid stability and to ensure reliable electricity supply and allow faster electrification of transport, heating and industry; underlines the role of public authorities in coordinating and planning grid development and calls for all COP 31 participants to endeavour to facilitate rapid infrastructure development worldwide;
144. Recognises the role of nuclear energy in achieving global carbon neutrality for those countries that choose to have it in their energy mix; notes with interest that the Declaration to Triple Global Nuclear Capacity by 2050, which was launched at COP28, has been signed by 38 countries, including 14 EU Member States and Ukraine;
145. Reaffirms the EU's commitment to promoting climate and energy policies while enhancing the objectives of competitiveness and energy security, and while respecting the decision of Member States to define their own energy mix;
146. Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible while recognising that some hard-to-abate sectors cannot yet rely substantially on electrification in the short- to medium-term; recognises that their import dependency exposes consumers globally to volatile price shocks and energy insecurity; calls on all COP Parties to

decarbonise their energy system and to direct new investments towards clean, home-grown and affordable energy production and generation, grid reinforcements and upgrades, smart electrification and non-fossil flexibility and storage;

147. Highlights the importance of addressing the ongoing energy crisis through coordinated and pragmatic solutions developed with international partners, in order to ensure stable and resilient energy supply chains; stresses the importance of reducing the impact of shocks in energy supply and energy security;
148. Recalls that between 2021 and 2024, energy prices faced by EU citizens and businesses were extremely high due to the energy market impact of Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine; notes that in order to alleviate the impact of high prices and address the urgent cost-of-living crisis, Member States adopted some temporary crisis measures, which resulted in an increase in fossil fuel subsidies (by 18 %) provided by Member States during this period; considers, in this regard, that electrification can play a positive role in reducing this vulnerability by enabling indigenous energy to be utilised more widely across the economy, when coupled with investments in grid development, flexibility and energy efficiency; considers, furthermore, that this can ultimately boost economic growth, strengthen energy security and reduce emissions; urges the Commission to come forward with its roadmap to further reduce and phase out fossil fuel subsidies;

Research and development

149. Underlines the role played by space technology in facilitating the scientific observation and collection of climate-related data; recognises, in this regard, the contribution of the Copernicus programme and the EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation;
150. Underlines the key role of AI and digital technologies in enhancing climate data analysis, improving energy system flexibility and efficiency, and enabling real-time tracking of GHG emissions, including methane, via satellite; takes note of the EU's strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in the energy sector;
151. Supports the role that the Horizon Europe programme and its partnerships play in driving public-private collaboration towards climate neutrality, ensuring sustainable, accessible and affordable innovation with a view to increasing the competitiveness of the economies of all EU countries;

Role of the European Parliament at COP31

152. Believes that Parliament should be an integral part of the EU delegation at COP31, given that it must give its consent to international agreements and that it plays a central role in the implementation at EU level of the Paris Agreement as one of the EU's co-legislators; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP31 in Antalya and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents in good time; commits to act independently and free from conflicts of interest;

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153. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the UN

Framework Convention on Climate Change, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.